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THE HARMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
BRUCE RYDER'
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICALLY EVALUATING CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY LAW
II. THE BREADTH AND INCOHERENCE OF CANADA'S CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY LAW
III. BEYOND A UNIFIED APPROACH
A. Images Involving Harm In Production
B. Hate Propaganda
C. Harmless Sexual Representations
1. Moral Corruption Arguments
2. Constitutional Limitations
3. Stories, Paintings and Sexual Education
i. John Robin Sharpe's Stories
ii. Eli Langer's Paintings and Sketches
iii. Show Me'
IV. FROM SEX AND ART TO VIOLENCE AND HATE
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICALLY EVALUATING CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY LAW
The definition of child pornography in Canada's Criminal Code, is
remarkably expansive. In amendments enacted in 2002,2 and further
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank
John Dixon and John McAlpine for giving me the opportunity to work with them on the written
submissions of the B.C. Civil Liberties Association for its intervention in the Sharpe case
before the B.C. Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. I would also like to express
my special appreciation to Professors Annie Bunting and Brenda Cossman, of York University
and the University of Toronto respectively. I would not have been able to think through these
issues without their inspiration, insights and support.
1 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1 [Criminal Code].
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amendments currently before the House of Commons, 3 the government has
signalled its commitment to further expansion. Our legislators do not seem
capable of resisting the argument that the broader the criminal prohibitions on
the creation, dissemination and use of child pornography, the better children
will be protected from the risks of sexual abuse.
Child sexual abuse is a topic that evokes visceral disgust in all reasonable
people. Demands for the enactment of child pornography laws followed
shortly after the "discovery" of child sexual abuse, largely as a result' of
feminist efforts, as a disturbingly widespread social phenomenon in the 1970s.
The difficulty of preventing acts of sexual abuse and punishing the
perpetrators has generated a great deal of anger and anxiety. It is perhaps
understandable that, as a result, much of this anger and anxiety gets directed at
representations of child sexual abuse, and that the difference between
representations of harmful acts and actual harmful acts is often lost in public
discourse. As Lise Gotell has noted, discussions of child pornography are
pervaded by
...a clear slippage from image to reality. Child pornography becomes constituted
as the graphic public face of a practice that has been shrouded by secrecy and
privacy. As image becomes reality, however, so too is reality contained within,
distorted and simplified by representation.
4
Noble and urgent motivations do not necessarily generate good law or
good public policy. Our legislators have yielded too quickly to the temptation
to adopt apparently simple solutions to a complex, disturbing and systemic
social problem. In doing so, they have pushed back our traditional
understandings of the appropriate limits on the use of the criminal law to
suppress expressive material.
Amy Adler has argued in the U.S. context that
Child pornography law is the new crucible of the First Amendment. It tests the
limits of modern free speech law the way political dissent did in the times of
Holmes and Brandeis... . Therefore, the law of child pornography is as important
2 An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to amend other Acts, S.C. 2002, c. 13, s. 5.
3 Bill C-20, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other
vulnerable persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, 2
"d Sess., 37"h Parl., cl. 7 [Bill C-20] (first
reading 5 December 2002).
4 Lise Gotell, "Inverting Image and Reality: R. v. Sharpe and the Moral Panic Around
Child Pornography" (2001/2002) 12 Const. Forum Const. 9 at 14. See also Kegan Doyle and
Dany Lacombe, "Scapegoat in Risk Society: The Case of Pedophile/Child Pornographer Robin
Sharpe" (2000) 20 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 183.
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for free speech scholars to scrutinize today as was the law of subversive advocacy
earlier this century.
5
Adler's concern is even more apt in Canada where the child pornography
offence is broader and the constitutional constraints placed on the expansion
of child pornography law are thus far much less rigorous than they are in the
United States.6 The strength of our commitment to freedom of expression is
revealed most clearly by our response to the kinds of speech that are
considered dangerously unthinkable in any particular era. Just as communist
speech was to the 1920s and 1930s, 7 child pornography and anti-terrorism
laws are to the first decade of the new millennium. They are two
contemporary developments that deserve heightened critical attention from
civil libertarians.
The aim of this essay is to challenge the view that the expansion of child
pornography offences can lead only to a decrease in harm to children and to
society. Canadian child pornography law, I will suggest, is incoherent. It is a
mix of progressive and regressive developments, crying out for fundamental
reconsideration.
In some respects, child pornography law makes a valuable contribution to
the prevention of child sexual abuse by targeting the production,
dissemination and use of material - "real" child pornography - that involved
harm in production. It also improves the law by criminalizing written and
visual material that advocates the commission of sexual crimes against
children and youth. The Criminal Code did not previously prohibit this kind of
hate propaganda. These are two important advances; yet as we shall see, even
in regard to "real" child pornography and hate propaganda, the law is badly
compromised.
In other respects, the law causes harm to society by suppressing thoughts
and expression concerning child and youth sexuality that involved no harm in
production, fall short of advocating harm and that have at best a tenuous
connection to the commission of harmful acts. The child pornography offence
criminalizes a range of creative expression in the absence of any persuasive
evidence of a risk of harm. While the Supreme Court of Canada made a
5 Amy Adler, "Inverting the First Amendment" (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921 at 921-22.
See also Amy Adler, "The Perverse Law of Child Pornography" (2001) 101 Colum. L. Rev.
209.
6 See Part II.C.2., infra (text accompanying notes 64-80).
7 See Frank R. Scott, "The Trial of the Toronto Communists" in Essays on the
Constitution: Aspects of Canadian law and politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1977) 49 at 49: "The trial and conviction of the eight Toronto Communists [in 1931] caused
many Canadians to ask themselves for the first time just what our British traditions of freedom
of speech and association really mean, if anything."
2003
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
contribution to limiting these aspects of the law in the Sharpe8 ruling, a more
fundamental reconsideration of the design and scope of the child pornography
offence is required.
Ii. THE BREADTH AND INCOHERENCE OF CANADA'S CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY LAW
The problems begin with the broad definition of child pornography employed
in the Criminal Code. The definition, set out in s. 163.1(1), reads as follows:
163.1 (1) In this section, "child pornography" means
(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was
made by electronic or mechanical means,
(i) that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of
eighteen years and is engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit
sexual activity, or
(ii) the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual
purpose, of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of
eighteen years; or
(b) any written material or visual representation that advocates or counsels sexual
activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence
under this Act.
Note that written texts are included only if they advocate or counsel the
commission of sexual offences against children or youth. If Bill C-20 is
passed in its current form, the definition will be extended to cover more
written material, including fictional representations of child and youth
sexuality.9 The Bill proposes to add a new subsection to the definition of child
pornography in s. 163.1(1):
8 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [Sharpe (2001)]. The Court held that the offence of
simple possession of child pornography in s. 163.1(4) of the Code is, in most of its applications,
a reasonable limit on the freedoms of thought, opinion, belief and expression set out in s. 2(b)
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The majority found that two kinds of applications of the
law were unconstitutional. They chose to limit the scope of the provision by employing the
"reading in" remedy. The majority added two exceptions to the law for materials possessed by
the accused exclusively for personal use: 1) written or visual representations created by the
accused; and 2) visual recordings of lawful activity created by or depicting the accused. For an
extensive critique of the Court's ruling, See Stan.Persky and John Dixon, On Kiddie Porn:
Sexual Representation, Free Speech and the Robin Sharpe Case (Vancouver: New Star Books,
2001).
9 Supra note 3, cl. 7(l).
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(c) any written material the dominant characteristic of which is the description, for
a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years
that would be an offence under this Act.
Section 163.1 applies to visual representations of real children, and to
representations of imaginary children.' 0 Producing and distributing a record of
actual child sexual abuse is treated in the same manner as a sketch, painting or
sculpture that depicts sexual abuse. The section defines "child" as a person
under the age of eighteen, even though the age of consent to sexual activity is
fourteen for most purposes. In ordinary parlance, and in the Criminal Code,
we do not refer to persons aged fourteen to seventeen as children. It would be
more consonant with the scheme of the Code to refer to children as persons
under the age of fourteen, to youth as persons aged fourteen to seventeen, and
to adults as persons eighteen and over." In this and other ways, s. 163.1 uses
the emotive and stigmatizing term "child pornography" in manipulative ways.
It is obviously problematic to treat an act as lawful, and then to subject any
use or viewing of representations of that act to substantial criminal penalties.
How to deal with the age issue in a child pornography law is a challenge.
Attempting to ascertain, through visual inspection of a sexual image, the age
of a young person used in the production of that image is a difficult or
impossible task. The vulnerability of teenagers to commercial exploitation and
other forms of coercion is a serious concern. For these reasons, simply using
fourteen as the age to define child pornography would not be a satisfactory
solution. A more cautious approach to the age issue is appropriate. But even
on a cautious approach, it is not apparent why the law does not adopt more
reasonable alternatives. For example, why not use a phrase such as "is or
appears to be under the age of fourteen", rather than using eighteen as the age
at which childhood presumptively ends for the purposes of sexual expression?
If it really is necessary to treat representations of sexual activity that involved
or appear to involve persons aged fourteen to seventeen as presumptively
criminal to prevent the commercial or coercive sexual exploitation of
teenagers, 2 why not include a defence that allows the accused to demonstrate
that no harm or commercial exploitation was involved in the production of the
images?
Section 163.1 of the Criminal Code establishes a comprehensive set of
offences related to child pornography including the familiar offences of
making, printing, publishing, distributing, selling, importing, and possessing
10 Sharpe (2001), supra note 8 at para. 38.
1 This is how I am using these terms in this article.
12 For a defence of this aspect of the law, see Janine Benedet, "Children in Pornography
After Sharpe" (2002) 43 C. de D. 327.
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for any of these purposes. 3 A recent amendment added prohibitions on
exporting and transmitting, and possessing for either of these purposes.' 4 The
maximum penalty for any of the above offences is ten years' imprisonment.
Finally, the child pornography provision includes two offences never before
employed by our criminal law to target expressive material: an offence of
simple possession,15 and an offence of knowingly accessing - simply viewing
- child pornography.' 6 It is, now, a criminal offence just to look at what you
know to be child pornography. The maximum penalty for simply possessing
or looking at child pornography is five years' imprisonment.
Some of the recent amendments are a legitimate response to the challenges
of prosecuting the users of real child pornography. This material circulates
predominantly through the exchange of images on the Internet. At the
moment, the vast majority of child pornography prosecutions involve charges
of simple possession of pictures that record the actual sexual exploitation of
children or youth. In this regard, the simple possession offence, considered
essential to effective enforcement at the time of its enactment in 1993, is even
more so now as Internet distribution has burgeoned. Yet, users of real child
pornography could easily avoid prosecution by not taking physical possession
of pictures. If we are truly determined to limit the creation and supply of these
images because they involve serious harms in their production, then we need
also to target every aspect of the demand. Hence, the new accessing and
transmitting offences. "Accessing" child pornography is defined as
"knowingly" causing "child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to"
oneself.
Henceforth, to gain convictions, the Crown will not have to prove that
accused persons actually took possession of child pornography by
downloading material onto their computers. It will be enough to show that
they intentionally viewed websites, email attachments or any other visual or
written representation that they knew fell within the definition of child
pornography. This certainly pushes Parliament's understandings of the harms
of using child pornography to the limit. It may well be justifiable in the case
of real child pornography, but to subject persons to criminal penalties for
simply looking at imaginary visual representations or texts, like stories or
paintings, is absurd. The recent amendments have heightened the folly of
treating disparate phenomena in the same way under the same rubric of "child
pornography". We will not develop coherent policy in this area until we
13 Criminal Code, supra note 1, ss. 163.1(2) and (3).
14 Ibid., s. 163.1(3), as am. by S.C. 2002, c. 13, s. 5(2).
'5 Ibid., s. 163.1(4).
I6 lbid., s. 163.1(4.1), as am. by S.C. 2002, c. 13, s. 5(3).
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abandon the unified approach s. 163.1 takes to very different kinds of sexual
expression.
The law currently includes three defences: artistic merit, "an educational,
scientific or medical purpose", and serving the public good. A bizarre and
troubling feature of the law is that the artistic merit-defence operates as a
complete defence no matter what the charge or the nature of the material at
issue. The language of s. 163.1(6) of the Criminal Code gives no discretion to
a judge: it states the accused "shall be found not guilty" if the representation
or written material that is the subject of the charge has artistic merit. In other
words, the creators and purveyors of pictures that involved the commission of
heinous crimes in their production could be exonerated if those pictures are
artfully conceived. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that "[a]ny
objectively established artistic value, however small, suffices to support the
defence", even if the material in question is harmful.' 7 The Court added that
the "educational, scientific or medical purpose" defence should also be
interpreted liberally.' 8
The existence of these defences was essential to the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the simple possession offence is constitutionally valid in
most of its applications. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority
of the Court in Sharpe, summarized her conclusion that the child
pornography provisions did not trench unduly on civil liberties:
... the legislation recognizes the importance of free expression and the danger of
a sweeping criminal prohibition. ... Writings are caught only where they actively
advocate or counsel illegal sexual activity with persons under the age of
18. Complementing these limits inherent in the s. 163.1(1) definition are an array
of defences aimed at enhancing the protection of free expression by excluding
materials with redeeming social benefits. Works of art, even of dubious artistic
value, are not caught at all. Materials created for an "educational, scientific or
medical purpose", liberally construed, are also exempted. Finally, a public good
defence, the precise scope of which remains to be determined, further protects the
possession of materials serving a necessary or advantageous social function.
... the defences exempt classes of material raising special free expression
concerns. In this way, Parliament has attempted to meet the dual concerns of
protecting children and protecting free expression. 19
If Bill C-20 is enacted by Parliament, virtually every constraining element
of the existing provision emphasized by McLachlin C.J.C. in the above
passage will be removed from the law. Written material would be caught if it
17 Sharpe (2001), supra note 8 at para. 63.
18 Ibid. at para. 69.
19 Ibid. at paras. 73-74.
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has as its dominant characteristic the description of sexual offences involving
children and youth for a sexual purpose.2° The defences of artistic merit and
"educational, scientific or medical purpose" would be repealed.21 The only
remaining defence would be serving the public good, a defence that the Court
acknowledged to be of uncertain and imprecise scope.22
As the foregoing review of the Canadian child pornography law reveals,
and contrary to the suggestion of the Chief Justice, Parliament has in fact done
little to balance the "dual concerns" of protecting children from sexual
exploitation and upholding civil liberties. Parliament gave short shrift to the
concerns of civil libertarians in 1993, expanding the scope of the child
pornography offence just prior to third reading without any opportunity for
public comment on the changes.23 The Court failed in Sharpe to hold
Parliament responsible for correcting the excesses of the 1993 law. In fact, it
resorted to its most extensive use of the "reading in" remedy to rescue the law
and thus let Parliament off the hook for achieving constitutional compliance.
It is perhaps not surprising that the Court was anxious to repair the law itself
and thus avoid the institutional heat it would have taken for striking down the
child pornography law. The power of the words "child pornography", and the
political necessity of declaring one's unwavering commitment to stamping it
out, invited judicial caution which in turn invited further Parliamentary
excess. Bill C-20 is the latest indication that Parliament is willing to take
extreme measures in the name of protecting children while giving little or no
serious consideration to the expressive freedoms supposedly guaranteed by the
Charter.
In summary, Bill C-20, like the child pornography provision as a whole, is
rendered incoherent by its insistence on responding to very different kinds of
expressive material in the same way. It makes very good sense to repeal the
defence of artistic merit insofar as material that involved harm in its
production is concerned. The same is true with respect to material that is the
equivalent of hate propaganda because it advocates the commission of
offences against children and youth. The inclusion of an artistic merit defence
for these two types of material was a blinding stupidity in the first place. But
to repeal the defence of artistic merit with respect to imaginary representations
20 Supra note 3, s. 7(1).
21 Ibid., s. 7(2).
22 Sharpe (2001), supra note 8 at paras. 70-71.
23 House of Commons Debates, Vol. XVI (15 June 1993) at 20843 (committee report
received), pp.20863-83 (third reading debate and vote); Brian Blugerman and Laurie May, "The
New Child Pornography Law: Difficulties of Bill C-128" (1995) 4 Media & Comm. L. Rev. 17
at 19-26; D. Lyon "A Bad Law on Child Pornography" Globe and Mail (22 June 1993) A23.
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that involved no harm in production, and do not advocate the commission of
harmful acts, makes no sense.
To be effective, the constitutional dialogue between courts and legislature
must be a genuine conversation founded on mutual respect and mutual
commitment to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. Bill C-
20's provisions in relation to child pornography are a direct affront to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Sharpe. If Members of Parliament pass the Bill in
its current form, thereby repealing the artistic merit defence at the same time
as the provision is extended to cover even more imaginative expression, they
would be sinking to a new low in their dialogue with the courts on the
appropriate scope of our constitutional rights and freedoms.
III. BEYOND A UNIFIED APPROACH
To move child pornography law in a more rational and constructive direction,
we need to overcome the unified approach the law now takes to disparate
phenomena. The current definition of child pornography embraces three very
different kinds of expressive material: 1) images involving harm in
production; 2) hate propaganda; and 3) harmless representations of the
sexuality of children and youth. It then treats these disparate phenomena in the
same way, subjects them all to the deeply stigmatizing label "child
pornography", makes it possible for accused persons to raise the same
defences in relation to each, and subjects each kind of material to the same
range of penalties. A law that responds to these three different kinds of
expressive materials in distinct ways could accomplish the objective of
preventing harm to children more effectively while avoiding the harms to
society that result from the current law. I will briefly describe each kind of
material and then outline the response I argue the criminal law should take to
each.
A. IMAGES INVOLVING HARM IN PRODUCTION
At the core of the current definition of child pornography are images that
record the actual sexual abuse of actual children. These kinds of images are
what most people think of when they think of child pornography. A
widespread consensus exists that the harms involved in the production of
sexually explicit images using real children justify the imposition of serious
penalties on anyone knowingly involved with their production, distribution or
use.
The addition of the child pornography offence to the Criminal Code in
199324 was driven by a clear and compelling moral imperative: the need to
criminalize the simple possession of images that recorded the sexual abuse of
24 Criminal Code, supra note 1, as am. by S.C. 1993, c. 46.
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real children. In the 1992 Butler ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada stated
that the obscenity provision of the Code prohibits sexually explicit images that
involve the use of real children in their production . The obscenity provision,
however, does not include an offence of simple possession. It does include a
range of offences related to the production, publication and distribution of
obscenity, including offences of possession for those purposes. Simple
possession - meaning possession in circumstances where the Crown cannot
prove an intention to further reproduce, distribute or sell the material - is not
prohibited by the obscenity provision.
The creation of sexually explicit images using real children is a serious
crime because it involves the commission of serious crimes. According to the
criminal law, young persons are presumed to lack the capacity to give
meaningful consent to sexual contact until they reach the age of fourteen.
With the exception of consensual sexual exploration by twelve and thirteen
26year olds with their peers, our law treats all sexual contact with children as
the equivalent of sexual assault. While the application of criminal prohibitions
to consensual sexual exploration between children of any age is of
questionable value, youth and adults who engage in sexual activity with
children are committing assaults that at the very least constitute serious
interferences with children's dignity and autonomy, and often result in the
infliction of grievous and enduring forms of physical and emotional pain.
The creators, producers and distributors of sexual explicit images that use
real children in their production are obviously the worst offenders in this
context. Identifying and arresting them, however, has proven very difficult. As
a result, it is now widely accepted that stopping the abuse of children in the
production of sexually explicit images requires that the criminal law target
persons contributing to the demand as well as the supply of this material. With
the enactment of the child pornography offence, Parliament added an offence
of simple possession of expressive material to our Criminal Code for the first
time in Canadian history. The theory is that those who purchase or collect
pictures of actual child abuse, even if only for their personal use, are creating
a market for an activity that causes serious harm to children. A second related
understanding of the harm involved is that the very existence of records of
child sexual abuse is an affront to the dignity of the children involved. The
urgent need to combat the harms related to the use of children in the
production of sexual imagery is the moral core of the child pornography
offence. When I refer to "harm in production", it is these harms I have in
mind.
25 R. v. Butler, [1992] I S.C.R. 452 at 485 [Butler].
26 Criminal Code, supra note I, s. 150.1(2).
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The creation of an offence designed to prevent harm in the production of
expressive material is a novel and welcome development in the law. Anti-
pornography feminist scholars have long argued that women are often
sexually assaulted in the production of sexually explicit imagery, and that
preventing further harm in production is a compelling rationale for proscribing
records of real violence. 27 Yet, obscenity law has been slow to embrace this
rationale for proscription, clinging instead, as will be explored in section
III.C.1. below, to an unpersuasive "moral corruption" paradigm that
emphasizes the indirect harms of exposure to violent representations. Shifts in
the patterns of enforcement of obscenity and related bodies of law, on the
other hand, suggest that harm in production is emerging as our dominant
concern.
For example, the definition of obscenity set out by the Supreme Court in
Butler28 includes (1) material that depicts violence, (2) material that is
degrading and dehumanizing and poses a substantial risk of harm to society,
and (3) material that used children in its production. The third category of
"real" child pornography involves harm in production. Material that falls
within the first category, representations of sexual violence, normally involves
harm in production as well since most prosecutions relate to imagery produced
using real people. It is only the middle category of degrading and
dehumanizing material that poses a substantial risk of harm to society - the
most uncertain and controversial branch of the Butler definition - that does
not clearly express a dominant concern with harm in production.
Further evidence of our emerging focus on material that involved harm in
production is that prosecutions of novels and other texts consisting solely of
written words, the main preoccupation of obscenity law up until the 1960s, are
now rare. Apart from writings that constitute hate propaganda, few would
notice if they ceased altogether. As Binnie J. remarked, with some
understatement, in the Little Sisters case,
It may be very difficult to make the case of obscenity against a book, which is a
medium perhaps less likely to be conducive to harm and more likely to be
protected by the artistic merit or "inherent necessities" defence. The history of
unsuccessful prosecutions of literary works in this country since Brodie v. The
Queen, [1962] S.C.R. 681 (Lady Chatterley's Lover) seems to bear out this
difficulty.
29
27 See e.g. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1993).
28 Butler, supra note 25.
29 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R.
1120 at para. 65 [Little Sisters].
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Contemporary obscenity practice, if not obscenity law, evidences a shift in
focus to material that involved harm in production: representations of actual
violence against actual people. Perhaps it is only a matter of time until
obscenity law catches up.
The focus of legislators' comments during the legislative and committee
debates on Bill C-128 (which added s.163.1 to the Criminal Code in 1993)
was the need to criminalize the simple possession of pictures that involved a
record of the sexual exploitation of real children. 30 There was no discussion of
whether the production or use of creative representations of imaginary
children increases the risk of sexual exploitation of children.
Since the mid-1980s, debate in Canada regarding child pornography has
been heavily influenced by two comprehensive reports on the subject. The
1984 Report of the Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youth
(the Badgley Report)3' and the 1985 Report of the Special Committee on
Pornography and Prostitution (the Fraser Report)32 were invoked regularly in
the debates leading to the passage of Bill C-128. Both reports clearly stated
that the objective of suppressing child pornography is to prevent the
exploitation of real children in the production of sexually explicit images.
Neither report identified creative sexual representations of imaginary children
as a problem contributing to the sexual exploitation of children. The Badgley
Report recommended the creation of a child pornography offence that would
be limited to visual depictions that used children or youth in their production.
Concerning the inadequacy of existing obscenity law to address child
pornography, the Committee stressed,
In reference to child pornography, it is the circumstances of its production,
namely, the sexual exploitation of young persons, which is a fundamental basis for
proscription. 
33
Like the Badgley Report, the Fraser committee's research revealed an
"absence of a really effective and direct sanction against persons who involve
30 House of Commons Debates, Vol. XVI (3 June 1993) at 20328-36 (second reading), (15
June 1993) at 20863-83 (third reading); Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, 34th Pan., No. 105 (8 June 1993), (10
June 1993), (15 June 1993); Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs, 340' Pan., No. 50 (21 June 1993), No. 51 (22 June 1993).
31 Canada, Sexual Offences Against Children: Report of the Conmitee on Sexual Offences
Against Children and Youths [Badgley Report] (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1984). See vol. I at 99-103 and vol. 2 at 1079-1285.
32 Canada, Pornography and Prostitution in Canada: Report of the Special Committee on
Pornography and Prostitution [Fraser Report] (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1985). See vol. 2 at 561-650.
33 Badgley Report, supra note 31, vol. I at 101 (emphasis in original).
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children in pornography." Therefore, the committee found "it is necessary to
provide direct criminal sanctions which would deter the use of children in the
production of pornography." The committee recommended the creation of a
number of sexual offences "specifically to address the use of young persons in
the production of sexually explicit material. 34
The importance of the objective of preventing harm in production of child
pornography is also underscored by Canada's international obligations. The
Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by Canada in 1991, commits
signatories to taking steps to protect children from all forms of sexual
exploitation and abuse, including "the exploitative use of children in
pornographic performances and materials., 35 The Convention defines a child
as "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. 3 6 Canada has also signed,
although it has not yet ratified, the Optional Protocol on the sale of children,
child prostitution, and child pornography.37 The Protocol requires states to
prohibit child pornography, defined as "any representation, by whatever
means, of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any
representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes.
38
The child pornography provisions of the Convention and the Protocol are
devoted exclusively to material that uses children - real human beings - in the
production of sexual imagery. Neither document commits states to putting
prohibitions in place on imaginative representations that do not involve harm
in production. Bill C-20 recites the need to fulfill Canada's international
obligations in the preamble, referring to the Convention and the Protocol.
39
Yet the controversial changes Bill C-20 would make to our child pornography
offence - expanding its reach more deeply into creative written expression,
and removing the defences of artistic merit and educational, scientific or
medical purpose with respect to such imaginary work - find no support in
either document.
It is worth noting that the preamble to the Protocol emphasizes the
importance of a "holistic approach" to combating child pornography:
34 Fraser Report, supra note 32, vol. 2 at 584-5, 629.
35 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, Art.
34.
36 Ibid., Art. 34(c).
37 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children,
child prostitution, and child pornography, UN GAOR, 54"' Sess., Annex II, Agenda Item 16,
UN Doc. A/RES/54/263 (2000) [Protocol].
38 Ibid., Art. 2(c).
39 Supra note 3.
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Believing that the elimination of the sale of children, child prostitution and child
pornography will be facilitated by adopting a holistic approach, addressing the
contributing factors, including underdevelopment, poverty, economic disparities,
inequitable socio-economic structure, dysfunctioning families, lack of education,
urban-rural migration, gender discrimination, irresponsible adult sexual behaviour,
harmful traditional practices, armed conflicts and trafficking in children ...40
Interestingly, the Canadian government's commitment to eradicating the
range of socio-economic conditions identified in the Protocol as contributors
to the production of child pornography is as limited as its approach to the
politics of criminalizing child pornography is vigorous (vigorous at least at the
symbolic level). No doubt there is a connection between this absence of a
commitment to systemic, structural change and the prominence of symbolic
politics.
4'
In summary, the Badgley Report, the Fraser Report and Canada's
international obligations all support the view that material that involved harm
in production calls for a serious criminal response, including a simple
possession offence, and strong penalties. Artistic merit should be irrelevant.
The harms associated with this kind of material clearly outweigh, and are in
no way attenuated, if the sexual abuse of children is recorded artistically. The
fact that the creators, purveyors and users of images that involved the actual
abuse of actual children can be exonerated if the images had artistic merit is
an abominable feature of the current law. The criminal prohibitions on this
category of material need to be strengthened and broadened. If passed, Bill C-
20 will accomplish this result by repealing the defences of artistic merit and an
educational, scientific or medical purpose. In this regard, Bill C-20 proposes
to move the law in a direction consonant with Canada's international
obligations. Further strengthening of the law would be achieved if material
that involved harm in production were treated separately in the Criminal
Code. At the moment, the inclusion of other less horrendous forms of
expression within the child pornography offence dilutes the uncompromising
condemnation material involving harm in production deserves.
B. HATE PROPAGANDA
The current definition of child pornography also includes, in s. 163.1(1)(b),
written material or visual representations that advocate or counsel the
40 Protocol, supra note 37, Preamble.
41 See Gotell, supra note 4 at 22: "Defining child pornography as an ultimate evil induces a
tunnel vision in which real threats to the welfare of children, from poverty and disintegrating
social programmes to the complexities and pervasiveness of child sexual abuse, are obscured. In
this way, the current hysteria around sexualized images of children can be seen as a backlash
against social structural analysis of disadvantage and disempowerment - a backlash that is
entirely consistent with the myopic vision of the law and order state."
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commission of sexual crimes against children or youth. As interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Sharpe, this aspect of the definition of child pornography
does not catch material that merely describes or depicts the commission of
sexual offences. z To meet the threshold of advocacy or counselling, the
written or visual work must actively induce or encourage the commission of
offences. The material, viewed objectively, must send the message that
behaviour that amounts to sexual assault or exploitation of children and youth
"can and should be pursued" 3
Written works, in contrast to visual representations, do not otherwise fall
within the current definition of child pornography. The reason for this is that
the rationale driving the enactment of the child pornography offence in 1993,
as recounted above, was to prohibit the simple possession of visual material
that involved actual harm in production. Section 163.1(1)(b) was added just
before third reading of the Bill in the House of Commons in response to
concerns expressed about the written advocacy of activity that constitutes the
sexual abuse of children.
Written expression, fictional or otherwise, regarding child sexuality or
child sexual abuse is not prohibited by the current law unless it advocates or
counsels the commission of sexual offences against children or youth. The
distinction between description, examination or analysis of harm on the one
hand, and advocacy of harm on the other, is crucial - and frequently lost in
public debate. In a democratic state we must be free to examine and explore
all aspects of our society, perhaps especially its darker and more troubling
aspects. We do little to eradicate, and may exacerbate, a systemic harm by
rendering its realities a taboo subject for creative and intellectual
investigation.
Written or visual representations that advocate or counsel the commission
of offences against children or youth are a different matter. As McLachlin
C.J.C. noted in Sharpe, "[a]lthough we recently held [in Little Sisters44] that it
may be difficult to make the case of obscenity against written texts, materials
that advocate or counsel sexual offences with children may qualify. '45 Indeed,
the circulation of material that explicitly advocates the commission of serious
acts of violence against any identifiable group should be capable of being
suppressed by the criminal law without violating Canadian understandings of
the appropriate balance between expressive freedoms and equality rights.
Advocating violence against an identifiable group is likely to constitute hate
propaganda as defined by s. 319 of the Criminal Code.
42 Supra note 8 at para. 56.
41 Ibid.
44 Supra note 29.
45 Supra note 8 at para. 103.
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Advocating or counselling the commission of sexual offences against
children or youth is best treated in the same manner as other kinds of hate
propaganda. The rationale and appropriate scope of the prohibition on this
material would be clearer if it were removed from the child pornography
provision, and, instead, "age" were added as a prohibited ground to the
definition of "identifiable groups" in s. 318(4).46 As is the case with other
material caught by s. 319, possession or private communication should not be
an offence, because our concern is with the public spreading of hate. As with
material that involved harm in production, artistic merit should be irrelevant.
Hate-mongering is more pernicious, not less so, if it is executed artfully. The
defences set out in s. 319(3) of the Code capture matters that ought to concern
us regarding potentially hateful expression more effectively than the defences
set out in the child pornography offence.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Keegstra47 is helpful in articulating the
limits of an offence targeting public communications that advocate or counsel
the commission of offences or otherwise spread hate against a group defined
by age or other personal characteristics. The offence is made out if the person
accused of communicating hateful messages intended to promote hatred or
must have known that such a result was substantially certain to occur. The
word "hate" limits the prohibition to what Dickson C.J.C. called the "most
severe and deeply-felt form of opprobrium".
48
There are a number of advantages to treating material that advocates or
counsels the commission of acts harmful to children and youth as hate
propaganda rather than child pornography.
First, it directs our attention to what is truly objectionable: the hateful
advocacy of harmful acts. The word pornography promotes the unfortunate
misapprehension that the root of our concern is descriptions of the sexuality of
children and youth. Of course, sexuality is all too frequently the vehicle for
the expression of violence and hate, and the sexual nature of a violation is
connected to its severity. Nevertheless, it is the nature and degree of the hate
46 The limited definition of "identifiable group" set out in s. 318 (offence of advocating
genocide) is applicable to s. 319, the hate propaganda provision. Consequently, the prohibition
on hate propaganda applies only to material targeting groups identified by "colour, race,
religion or ethnic origin." In addition to "age", "sex" and "sexual orientation" need to be added
to the definition as well, given the prevalence of hateful speech directed at women and sexual
minorities. Indeed, given their association with deeply rooted patterns of prejudice that have
proven persistent across space and time a strong case can be made for including most personal
characteristics listed in anti-discriminations laws, like s. 15 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and human rights statutes.
47 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
48 Ibid. at 786.
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and violence that should be the focus of our condemnation. The fact that it
takes a sexual form is relevant in assessing the severity of the harm inflicted.
Second, our obsession with sexual representations has distracted us from
paying attention to other kinds of hateful expression. Sadly, in our culture the
physical and emotional abuse of children is prevalent in both sexual and non-
sexual contexts. Why should representations advocating the commission of
non-sexual crimes against children and youth be treated less harshly by the
criminal law? Moving hateful expression from the child pornography to the
hate propaganda provision would result in a more comprehensive and rational
legal condemnation. Indeed, the law's response to all sexual representations,
including obscenity that depicts adults, would be improved if we removed any
sexual component from our definitions of expressive material prohibited by
the criminal law. If the obscenity and child pornography provisions were
repealed and replaced with two new offences relating to material that
constitutes hate propaganda, and material that involved harm in production,
we would do much to advance the protection of women, children and other
vulnerable groups at the same time as we better secured the expressive
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.
C. HARMLESS SEXUAL REPRESENTATIONS
The definition of child pornography embraces sexual representations of
children or youth that involved no harm in production, and do not amount to
hate propaganda. It does so in three ways. It includes imaginary visual
representations such as sculptures, drawings and paintings. It also includes
visual records of lawful sexual activity engaged in by teenagers. If Bill C-20
becomes law, the definition will soon extend to "any written material the
dominant characteristic of which is the description, for a sexual purpose" of
the commission of sexual offences against children and youth. These three
kinds of material involve no harm in production, nor do they promote hate or
advocate the commission of crimes against children. I will refer to them
collectively as "harmless sexual representations".
1. MORAL CORRUPTION ARGUMENTS
Of course, many people do not agree that these kinds of representations are
"harmless". They would argue that even if representations did not involve
harm in production, and even if they do not advocate or counsel the
commission of crimes against children and youth, exposure to them makes it
more likely that those exposed will commit sexual crimes against children.
But this "indirect harm" argument is unpersuasive. The argument that
exposure to imaginary representations of criminal activity causes persons
exposed to engage in criminal activity has been a fixture of thinking about
obscenity law for more than a century. It had been gradually declining in
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credibility since the 1950s before being given new life in the 1990s in the
context of child pornography. I will refer to it as a "moral corruption"
argument, because it rests on the proposition that a person's morals will be
corrupted and criminal behaviour induced by exposure to representations of
crime. This familiar style of argument runs as follows: exposure to
representations of bad acts causes bad thoughts, which in turn causes bad
behaviour, therefore the criminal suppression of the representations of bad
acts is justified.
For many years, obscenity law was dominated by the "moral corruption"
test put forward by Chief Justice Cockburn in the 1868 English case of R. v.
Hicklin:
[T]he test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.49
The Hicklin test was interpreted by the courts in at least three senses: the
tendency of the material could be to arouse bad thoughts in the minds of
persons exposed to it; the tendency of the material could be to incite persons
exposed to it to commit immoral or illegal acts; and the tendency of the
material could be to endanger prevailing standards of public morality.
50
Normally, these three conceptions of moral corruption would be intertwined in
judicial reasoning and legislative debates: the harm consisted of the arousal of
bad thoughts (that is, thoughts out of line with public standards of morality)
that were presumed to create a risk of the commission of bad acts (normally
conceived of as sexual activity other than procreative acts within marriage).
The Hicklin moral corruption style of argument was not used solely to
justify restrictions on sexual expression. It was presumably the basis of
Customs' prohibition on the importation of dozens of pulp magazines
specializing in crime and detective fiction in the 1930s and 1940s. 5' Moral
49 (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 at 371.
50 See Norman St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law (London: Secker and Warburg,
1956) at 126.
51 It is difficult to know for sure why the Customs department banned particular titles since
Customs did not issue reasons for its decisions. Customs officials had the power to prohibit the
importation of "immoral" or "indecent" literature from the time of Confederation until 1985,
when the prohibition was declared unconstitutional and replaced with a prohibition on the
importation of obscene material. Official memoranda were issued to Customs collectors from
the 1880s to the late 1950s instructing officials to detain particular titles at the border. The
official memoranda from 1928-47, which can be found in the Metro Toronto Reference Library,
Special Collections, contain many titles of pulp magazines devoted to crime and detective
stories. For an overview of Customs' censorship of literature, see Bruce Ryder, "Undercover
Censorship: Exploring the History of the Regulation of Publications in Canada" in Klaus
Petersen and Allan C. Hutchinson eds., Interpreting Censorship in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999) 129 at 131-138.
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corruption arguments led Parliament to enact a prohibition on crime comics in
1949.52 The assumption was that youth exposed to representations of crime
would be incited to commit criminal acts themselves. 53 Members of
Parliament asserted a correlation between acts of juvenile delinquency and the
reading of crime comics, which they backed up with lurid tales of crimes
committed by youth who they alleged were simply copying what they had
read in the comics. Of course, millions of youth read crime comics at the time,
so the discovery of a correlation between crime comics and juvenile
delinquency was not particularly revealing. 54 The chief logical fallacy relied
upon by the proponents of the crime comics offence was the leap from
correlation to proof of causation. Yet, at the time, no Member of Parliament
challenged the causal hypothesis regarding crime comics. The "common
sense" of the debate was that the apprehension of harm was a reasoned one.
This consensus lasted only a few years. The crime comics offence, still in the
Criminal Code, has been essentially a dead letter since the mid-1950s.
55
When the obscenity provision of the Criminal Code was amended in 1959,
the Minister of Justice, Davie Fulton, asserted that his intention was not to call
into question the Hicklin precedent. Rather, it was to provide greater certainty
and objectivity to obscenity law. This could be done, Fulton suggested, if
Parliament supplemented the Hicklin test with a statutory presumption that
exposure to material that unduly exploited sex as a dominant characteristic
would have morally corrupting effects.
5 6
Nor did the 5-4 ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Lady
Chatterley's Lover case, Brodie v. The Queen,57 disrupt the moral corruption
paradigm. A majority of the Court ignored Fulton's views, and stated that the
Hicklin test was no longer part of the law of obscenity in Canada. As a result,
the Court treated the amendment that Fulton had intended to be a statutory
52An Act to amend the Criminal Code, S.C. 1949 (214 Sess.), c. 13, s. 1.
53 See e.g. House of Commons Debates, Vol. 1 (4 October 1949) at 511-18, (6 October
1949) at pp. 578-89, Vol. III (5 December 1949) at 2687-99.
54 See Bradford W. Wright, Comic Book Nation: The Transformation of Youth Culture in
America (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001). As Wright puts it (at
96), "It was hardly surprising that juvenile delinquents read comic books, since upwards of 90
percent of all children and adolescents read them".
55 The prohibition on crime comics has attracted substantial scholarly attention. See e.g.
Janice Dickin McGinnis, "Bogeymen and The Law: Crime Comics and Pornography" (1988)
20 Ottawa L. Rev. 3; Jonathan Swainger, "American Crime Comics as Villains: An Incident
from Northern Canada" (1998) 22 Legal Studies Forum 215; Augustine Brannigan,
"Mystification of the Innocents: Crime Comics and Delinquency in Canada, 1931-1949" (1986)
7 Criminal Justice History I 1.
56 House of Commons Debates, Vol. V (6 July 1959) at 5517-46.
17 [1962] S.C.R. 681.
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presumption as the sole definition of obscenity. Obscenity law could no longer
be concerned with morality writ large. Henceforth it would be focused
exclusively on sexual immorality: material that unduly exploited sex as a
dominant characteristic. The Brodie decision reformulated, but did not
remove, the moral corruption arguments at the heart of obscenity law. The
difference between the members of the Supreme Court was that the dissenters
believed that all expression that aroused "lewd" thoughts ought to be
criminalized, while the majority believed that to be the case only of "dirt for
dirt's sake" (dirt in this context apparently meaning sexual expression).
Thirty years later in Butler,58 the Court held that protecting moral standards
- that is, prohibiting "dirt for dirt's sake" - is not a sufficiently important
objective to justify overriding Charter freedoms. In doing so, Sopinka J.,
writing for the majority, described the discredited Hicklin test as one devoted
primarily, if not exclusively, to the preservation of society's moral standards.5 9
Sopinka J. rejected this aspect of the Hicklin conception of moral harm: it was
no longer acceptable to suppress speech to maintain "conventional standards
of propriety". 60 In other regards, the moral corruption paradigm - exposure to
bad thoughts can be safely presumed to cause persons so exposed to commit
bad acts - remained intact and indeed was given new legitimacy by Butler.
The Court accepted the "causal hypothesis", even though the government
offered no persuasive evidence in support of it. Sopinka J. claimed that his
acceptance of the causal link was based in "reason". 6 1 But in the absence of
social science evidence, how can that be so? And even if we are willing to
assume that the prohibition is based on "a reasoned apprehension of harm",
why is the obscenity provision restricted to sexual representations? Why
should we be any less concerned about fictional representations of non-sexual
violence? The very existence of obscenity as a category limited to sexual
representations is deeply irrational.
As Brenda Cossman has persuasively demonstrated, the Butler ruling
purports to present a new feminist paradigm but is in fact just "morality in
,62drag". A straight genealogical line joins Hicklin, Butler and child
pornography law. The difference lies in the conception of the vulnerable
58 Supra note 25.
51 Ibid. at 492.
' Ibid. at 498.
61 Ibid. at 504.
62 Brenda Cossman, "Feminist Fashion or Morality in Drag? The Sexual Subtext of the
Butler Decision" in B. Cossman et al, eds., Bad Attitude/s on Trial: Pornography, Feminism
and the Butler Decision (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 107. See also Brenda
Cossman, Censorship and the Arts: Law, Controversy, Debate, Facts (Toronto: Ontario
Association of Art Galleries, 1995).
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persons at risk of moral corruption: youth and the lower classes according to
Hicklin, adult men according to Butler, and pedophiles according to child
pornography law.
The problem is that, at least as far as fictional depictions of crime and
violence are concerned, the evidence simply does not support the "causal
hypothesis" that underpins the moral corruption style of argument.63 Its
enduring appeal probably lies, not in its rationality, but in its promise of
simple solutions to disturbing and complex social problems such as juvenile
delinquency, the perceived moral failings of the lower classes, violence
against women, or the sexual abuse of children.
The lack of evidence to support the causal hypothesis underlying the moral
corruption argument helps explain why fictional representations of non-sexual
crime and violence in popular culture no longer attract a criminal response.
There is no rational basis for treating exposure to imaginary representations of
sexual assault as more dangerous than exposure to representations of murder
and mutilation. As for imaginary or real representations of the lawful sexual
activity of teenagers, it is even less rational to presume that people exposed to
them will be more likely to commit unlawful sexual acts. We need to face up
to and remove this odd collection of beliefs embedded in our child
pornography law.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Constitutional challenges to child pornography laws in the United States have
been successful in focusing those laws on material that involved harm in
production. The U.S. Supreme Court has considered child pornography laws
on three occasions. In New York v. Ferber,64 the Court upheld a New York
statute that prohibited the distribution of visual material that depicted a person
under the age of 16 engaged in a "sexual performance". Justice White,
delivering the opinion of the Court, held that the restriction on free speech was
justified by the state's compelling interest in preventing the sexual
exploitation and abuse of children. "[T]he use of children as subjects of
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental
63 See Jonathan Freedman, Media Violence and Its Effect on Aggression: Assessing the
Scientific Evidence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). Freedman undertakes a
thorough examination of studies that have tested what he calls the "causal hypothesis" (preface,
at p. x): the notion that exposure to fictional media violence increases aggression. He concludes
(at p. 210) that "the evidence does not support the notion that exposure to media violence
causes aggression or desensitization to aggression". See also Martin Barker and Julian Petley
eds., Ill Effects: The Media/Violence Debate (London & New York: Routledge, 1997).
64 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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health of the child. 65 Targeting the distribution and use of real child
pornography may help reduce the harms of child sexual abuse in three ways:
First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the children's participation
and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the
distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of
material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively
controlled. ... Third. The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an
economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such
materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.
66
Justice White noted that a law prohibiting sexual representations that did not
involve children in their production would not be rationally connected to the
objective of preventing the sexual exploitation of children.67
In Osborne v. Ohio,68 the Court upheld a simple possession offence in a
law again restricted to material that used actual children in its production.
Justice White, again writing for the Court, spoke of the need "to stamp out this
vice at all levels of the distribution chain." 69 In addition to the concerns
expressed in Ferber relating to harm in production, Justice White cited the
value of encouraging the destruction of child pornography to prevent
pedophiles from using it "to seduce other children into sexual activity."
70
The Court later pulled away from the latter line of argument in Ashcroft v.
The Free Speech Coalition.71 At issue was the validity of Congress' attempt to
proscribe "virtual child pornography" in the 1996 Child Pornography
Protection Act (CPPA). The Act prohibited "any visual depiction" that "is, or
appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct". 72 The
provision extended to images that did not involve harm in production, but
were visually indistinguishable from those that did. The Court struck down the
provision as a violation of freedom of speech.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that a prohibition limited
to "real" child pornography would be justified for the reasons expressed in
Ferber. Even if such material had serious literary, artistic or other merit, that
would not excuse the' harm caused in its production; however, material that
65 Ibid. at 758.
66 Ibid. at 759, 761.
67 Ibid. at 764-5.
68 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
69 Ibid. at 110.
70 Ibid. at I11.
7 122 S. Ct. 1389 (U.S. 2002).
72 18 U.S.C. §. 2256(8)(B) (2002).
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did not involve harm in its production could not be suppressed by the CPPA
without violating the First Amendment. In Justice Kennedy's words,
In contrast to the speech in Ferber, speech that is itself the record of sexual abuse,
the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its
production. Virtual child pornography is not "intrinsically related" to the sexual
abuse of children, as were the materials in Ferber. While the Government asserts
that the images can lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is
contingent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily flow from the s eech, but
depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts.
Justice Kennedy then dismissed the "grooming" argument that images that
did not involve harm in production may be used by pedophiles in attempts to
seduce children. As he pointed out, if we accepted the logic of this argument
as sufficient to sustain the imposition of criminal penalties on expression, the
consequences for civil liberties could be sweeping:
There are many things innocent in themselves, however, such as cartoons, video
games, and candy, that might be used for immoral purposes, yet we would not
expect those to be prohibited because they can be misused.
Moreover, he added, we cannot allow what is fit for children, or pedophiles, to
set the standard of what is permissible for the entire population." As for the
argument that virtual child pornography would incite pedophiles to criminal
activity,
[t]he government has shown no more than a remote connection between speech
that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse. Without
a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not prohibit
speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal
conduct.
76
The U.S. Supreme Court rulings on child pornography laws are helpful in
two regards: they insist that the law draw a clear distinction between material
that involved harm in production and material that is alleged to cause "indirect
harms"; as well, they critically evaluate "moral corruption" arguments and
find them lacking.
The Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Sharpe, in contrast, is especially
weak on both of these points. Throughout her judgment for the majority,
McLachlin C.J.C. treats the harm in production and moral corruption
rationales as having equivalent moral force. Indeed, much of her section 1
73 Supra note 71 at 1402.
74 Ibid.
" Ibid. at 1402-3.
76 Ibid. at 1403.
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analysis draws no distinction between real and imaginary sexual
representations, as if they raised the same set of concerns and issues. She
accepted uncritically the argument that exposure to any child pornography,
even material that involved no harm in production, may cause persons to
engage in criminal activity.77 The Chief Justice was not troubled by the fact
that the scientific evidence in support of the causal hypothesis is "not
strong".78 She asserted that a "reasoned apprehension" of indirect harm
exists.7 9 These indirect harms include the likelihood that pedophiles' bad
thoughts will be confirmed and fuelled by exposure to representation of bad
acts (the "cognitive distortions" argument); that they will use representations
of child and youth sexuality in attempts to induce children to engage in illegal
sexual activity (the "grooming" argument); and that exposure to representat-
ions of sexual offences will cause those exposed to commit sexual offences in
the future (the "incitement" argument). All three are familiar variations on the
"moral corruption" theme.
The acceptance of the "cognitive distortions" and "grooming" arguments
as a sufficient reason for suppressing creative works seriously undermines our
commitment to freedom of expression. If these are sufficiently compelling
reasons for overriding the constitutional status of the freedom, virtually any
material that expresses ideas that meet with official disapproval could be
suppressed. "Cognitive distortions" is just fancy language for bad ideas. We
cannot suppress expression simply because we do not like the ideas expressed.
The "grooming" argument, as Justice Kennedy noted in Ashcroft, would
justify the suppression of any material by reference to the use it may be put to
by pedophiles. We should not limit everyone's freedom to create, write, read
and view to material that poses no danger in the hands of the most troubled
members of society.
The conclusion that a reasoned apprehension of indirect harms justifies
the suppression of expression is troubling with respect to both types of
material caught by s. 163.1 that do not involve harm in production:
representations of lawful teenage sexuality and works of the imagination.
On what reasoned basis would we presume that exposure to images of
lawful acts leads people to commit crimes? On what reasoned basis would
we conclude that exposure to imaginary representations of crimes leads
people to commit crimes? Does the Chief Justice mean to suggest that all
forms of popular entertainment that depict criminal acts could be
77 Supra note 8 at para. 28 ("Possession of child pornography may facilitate the
seduction and grooming of victims and may break down inhibitions or incite potential
offences").
78 Ibid. at para. 88.
71 Ibid.
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suppressed on a "reasoned apprehension of harm" without violating the
Charter? The ruling in Sharpe leaves us with no reason to be confident that
irrational fears and anxieties, rather than reason, are at work here.
I have suggested that a better approach would be to remove material that
falls short of hate mongering, and involved no harm in production, from the
Criminal Code altogether. The "indirect harms" that allegedly arise from this
kind of material are too speculative and uncertain to support a criminal
prohibition. Parliament appears to be moving in precisely the opposite
direction, seeking to condemn this material as forcefully as the "real" child
pornography and the hate propaganda described above. If Bill C-20 is passed,
the category of harmless sexual representations that fall within the definition
of child pornography will be expanded, and the defences of artistic merit and
an educational, scientific or medical purpose will be repealed. Depriving
accused persons of these defences in charges relating to harmless sexual
representations renders the child pornography provision as a whole vulnerable
yet again to a Charter challenge. In this regard, Parliament's zeal, far from
protecting children from harm, is recklessly threatening the whole edifice of
child pornography law.
80
3. STORIES, PAINTINGS AND SEXUAL EDUCATION
Because those who argue that child pornography law threatens legitimate civil
libertarian concerns are often accused of raising far-fetched or unreal
"hypothetical" scenarios, 8' let me illustrate the child pornography offence's
impact, or potential impact, on harmless sexual representations by using three
very real examples of expressive material drawn from the case law: John
Robin Sharpe's stories, Eli Langer's sketches and paintings, and the sex
education book Show Me!
i. John Robin Sharpe's Stories
John Robin Sharpe was charged in 1996 with simple possession, and possess-
ion for the purposes of distribution or sale, of both his own written work and
hundreds of pictures of teenage boys. His case went to trial in 2002 after his
challenge to the validity of the possession offence failed at the Supreme Court
80 See June Ross, "R. v. Sharpe and the Defence of Artistic Merit", (2001/2002) 12 Const.
Forum Const. 23. As she concludes (at 29), "Where proven harm exists, as when children are
employed in the production of child pornography, even the significant Charter value of artistic
expression could be outweighed. But with a broad definition of child pornography, and reliance
on the reasoned apprehension of harm test, a defence for material of literary or artistic merit is a
constitutional necessity."
81 See e.g. Benedet, supra note 12.
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82of Canada. At trial, he was convicted in relation to the pictures, some of
which depicted children under the age of fourteen.83 This aspect of the
disposition of his case should be relatively uncontroversial because some of
this material involved harm in production. It depicted the commission of
sexual offences against children, namely sexual interference, an invitation to
sexual touching (or at least the photographic equivalent thereof), and perhaps
also sexual exploitation in the case of boys aged fourteen to seventeen. 84 Mr.
Sharpe was acquitted on the charges relating to the stories he authored.
Although the stories described sadomasochistic sexual activity involving
children and youth, Shaw J. held that they did not counsel or advocate the
commission of crimes. In a clear-headed judgment, remarkable for its courage
in the current climate, he concluded as follows:
While Boyabuse and Stand By America, 1953 arguably glorify the acts described
therein, in my opinion they do not go so far as to actively promote their
commission. The descriptions may well be designed to titillate or excite the reader
(if the reader is so inclined) but these descriptions do not actively advocate or
counsel the reader to engage in the acts described.
Nor, in my view, do Boyabuse and Stand By America, 1953 send "the message"
that sex with children can and should be pursued. If that were the case, then
literature describing murder, robbery, theft, rape, drug use and other crimes in
such a way as to make them appear enjoyable would likewise be said to advocate
or counsel the commission of those crimes. In my opinion, such literature is not
what the "advocates or counsels" requirement is intended to capture.
Where written material is simply a thinly disguised exhortation to seduce children
or to otherwise make them prey to sexual crimes, such writing may well advocate
or counsel such crimes. But that is not the case with Boyabuse and Stand By
America, 1953. These writings simply describe morally repugnant acts.85
Although it was not necessary to his decision, Shaw J. provided a second
reason for dismissing the charges against Mr. Sharpe in relation to his stories:
they had artistic merit. After fully canvassing the conflicting expert opinion
presented at trial, he concluded that, even though the scenes of
sadomasochistic violence and sex involving young boys were morally
repugnant, they were presented in a manner that had some literary merit.
86
82 Sharpe (2001), supra note 8.
83 R. v. Sharpe, 91 C.R.R. (2d) 235, [2002] B.C.J. No. 610 (B.C.S.C.) (QL) [Sharpe (2002)
cited to B.C.J. (QL)].
84 The offences of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual
exploitation are set out in ss. 151, 152 and 153 of the Criminal Code respectively.
85 Sharpe (2002), supra note 83 at paras. 33-35.
86 Ibid. at paras. 107-15.
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According to s. 163.1(6) of the Criminal Code, a judge has to acquit if artistic
merit exists, and the Supreme Court said any literary merit would suffice.87
For these reasons, the conclusion reached by Shaw J. seemed unavoidable.
88
Nevertheless, his ruling generated another firestorm of protest,89 just as his
initial ruling invalidating the simple possession offence had three years
earlier.90 Many people seemed to find it inconceivable that artistic merit could
exonerate someone who has created and possessed child pornography. Such a
reaction makes perfect sense in relation to material that involved harm in
production or that amounts to hate propaganda. Yet, creative expression that
simply describes criminal acts should not be illegal for that reason alone,
whether it has artistic merit or not. The first reason that Shaw J. gave for
dismissing the charges arising out of Mr. Sharpe's possession of his stories -
that they did not constitute the equivalent of hate propaganda - is the most
compelling.
Unfortunately, Parliament has responded, in Bill C-20, 9' by directly
targeting the two reasons why stories like Mr. Sharpe's could not provide the
basis for a criminal conviction under the current law.
First, if Bill C-20 is passed, written work or visual representations that
merely describe activity that amounts to a sexual offence against children or
youth will constitute child pornography, if that description is the dominant
characteristic of the work and it is done for a sexual purpose. Mr. Sharpe's
stories may well fall within this proposed extension of the law. A cautious
criminal lawyer might advise him to cease sharing his stories with anyone else
and to destroy extra copies. Mr. Sharpe could keep a copy or perhaps several
copies so long as he has no intention of ever showing them to anyone.92 No
matter how morally repugnant we find the acts depicted or described in works
of the imagination, requiring the creators of imaginative works to destroy their
creations on penalty of criminal sanction should never occur in a society that
claims to be free and democratic.
87 Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
88 For a discussion of the artistic merit of Mr. Sharpe's stories, see Shannon Bell,
"Sharpe's Perverse Aesthetic" (2001/2002) 12 Const. Forum Const. 30.
89 See e.g. Mark Hume "Sharpe's Porn Has 'Merit': Court" National Post (27 March 2002)
AI; Jane Armstrong "B.C. court finds artistic merit in Sharpe's child-sex stories" Globe and
Mail (27 March 2002) Al.
90 R. v. Sharpe, (1999) 169 D.L.R. (4') 536 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd (1999), 175 D.L.R. (4") 1
(B.C.C.A.), rev'd by the Supreme Court of Canada, supra note 8.
91 Supra note 3.
92 Simple possession of his own stories, exclusively for his own personal use, would fall




Second, the artistic merit defence would be repealed if Bill C-20 were
passed. The result would be the creation of a taboo topic, one that cannot be
imagined or explored in the form of words or images without incurring a
substantial risk of criminal prosecution. If Parliament does decide to embrace
these extreme results by passing Bill C-20, it is likely that the child
pornography law will not survive the inevitable Charter challenge.
ii. Eli Langer's Paintings and Sketches
Eli Langer's sketches and paintings were exhibited at the Mercer Union
Gallery in Toronto in 1994. This exhibit generated one of the first
prosecutions brought pursuant to the child pornography provisions of the
Criminal Code.93 After initially laying charges against Mr. Langer and the
gallery, the Crown decided to proceed with a forfeiture application pursuant to
s. 164 of the Code. The works of creative visual expression in question
involved what the judge, McCombs J., described as "deeply disturbing"
depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit activity. After assessing the
conflicting expert evidence presented to the court, McCombs J. said he could
not conclude that the paintings and sketches posed a realistic risk of harm to
children.94 As he put it, although
... the subject-matter of the paintings and drawings is shocking and disturbing, the
work as a whole is presented in a condemnatory manner that is not intended to
celebrate the subject-matter. In other words, the purpose of the work is not to
condone child sexual abuse, but to lament the reality of it.
95
Moreover, McCombs J. accepted the uncontradicted expert evidence that Mr.
Langer's work had artistic merit. 96 In the result, he dismissed the Crown's
attempt to have the paintings and sketches destroyed, and ordered them
returned to Mr. Langer.
If Bill C-20 becomes law, the defence of artistic merit would no longer be
available, nor would the defence of an educational, scientific or medical
purpose. Paintings and sketches like Mr. Langer's would violate s. 163.1
unless the defence of public good applied. Bill C-20 proposes that the public
good defence be reframed in the following terms:
No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the acts that are
alleged to constitute the offence, or if the material related to those acts that is
93 Ontario (Attorney General) v. Langer (1995), 123 D.L.R. (4011) 289 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.),
leave to appeal and cross-appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused II October 1995.
14 Ibid. at 304.
" Ibid. at 306.
96 Ibid.
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alleged to contain child pornography, serve the public good and do not extend
beyond what serves the public good.97
The public good is a notoriously vague concept. As the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Sharpe, the precise contours of the defence of public good
are uncertain. Parliament has not provided any guidance on its meaning. It is
not defined in the Criminal Code or in the proposed amendments contained in
Bill C-20. Since it is so vague, and since it now determines the degree to
which creative expression falling within the definition of child pornography
can escape criminal sanction, the courts may well find that the child
pornography offences now violate s. 7 of the Charter (as well as s. 2(b)) and
that they fail to meet the "prescribed by law" component of the s. 1 analysis.
98
The "public good" is analogous to the "public interest", a phrase the Supreme
Court of Canada has found to be unconstitutionally vague.99 Both expressions
are "standardless".' 0 How would judges determine whether works of art
exploring issues of child and youth sexuality serve the public good? And how
would creators of such works make sure that they did not exceed the bounds
of serving the public good?
The public good defence has been part of the obscenity provision of the
Code since its original enactment in 1892. It has played little role in protecting
works of art or literature in the reported case law. It did serve to exonerate
Dorothea Palmer when she was charged with distributing birth control
97 Supra note 3, cl. 7(2), proposing to amend s. 163.1(6) and (7) of the Criminal Code.
98 To be upheld as a reasonable limit on Charter rights or freedoms, government action
must be "prescribed by law". To meet the prescribed by law component, a law must not be too
vague. Vagueness is also a principle of fundamental justice for the purposes of s. 7 of the
Charter. A law will be held to be unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to
give sufficient guidance for legal debate. See e.g. R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606. The requirements of the vagueness doctrine should be strict in the context
of criminal prohibitions on the creation, dissemination, use and viewing of expressive material.
The potential for "chilling" creative expression is real. Creators need to know with some degree
of certainty at what point their imaginative work might be crossing the line into criminal
territory. The best approach, I have argued, is to leave creative expression that does not amount
to hate propaganda outside the scope of the criminal law altogether.
99 R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, 732 ("...the term 'public interest' is incapable of
framing the legal debate in any meaningful manner or structuring discretion in any way... No
amount of judicial interpretation of the term 'public interest' would be capable of rendering it a
provision which gives any guidance for legal debate."); R, v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075,
1113 ("We find the 'public interest' justification to be so vague as to provide no meaningful
guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the justification of a limitation on
constitutional rights.").
10o Morales, ibid. at 715.
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information in 1936.'10 In 1952, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that
the defence did not apply to the distribution of four paperback novels,
including two of Erskine Caldwell's novels depicting poverty and debauchery
in rural Georgia.'0 2 The same court rejected the defence in 1956 in an
obscenity case involving a pulp paperback novel depicting the personal
struggles of a psychiatric patient, including his difficulties in forming intimate
relationships with women. 103
The public good defence did not assist the Barbara Cameron Gallery when
it was charged in 1965 under the obscenity provision for displaying paintings
that depicted adult nudity and sexuality.10 4 Aylesworth J.A., writing for the
majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal, noted that "there is little judicial
guidance upon the general subject of public good.' 1 5 He then went on to
reject the defence, making it clear that, in his view, material found to be
obscene could rarely, if ever, promote the public good:
Why is it necessary for the sake of the student or for the sake of education of the
public in the appreciation of art so far as the human form is concerned, to depict
obscene subject-matter, to place the human figure, for example, in a posture of
"sexual invitation" or the human figures in a relationship with one another such as
has already been described with respect to these drawings? To me, the posing of
the question invites one answer only. To accomplish that which it is said these
drawings accomplish by way of public benefit and to the restricted extent
described in the evidence of the experts, the exposure of these obscene drawings
106was wholly unnecessary...
The paintings that were at issue in Cameron are now a long way removed
from contemporary understandings of obscenity. Still, judges in child
pornography cases may well replicate the response to the public good defence
evoked by material Aylesworth J.A. considered obscene in 1966. Though the
moral context is very different, the moral fervour is likely to be similar. Only
101 R. v. Palmer (1937), 68 C.C.C. 20 (Ont. C.A.). The trial judge in that case was clearly
grateful that the defence permitted him to help prevent the nation from, as he put it, "wandering
in the intellectual and social wilderness on this vital subject." Ibid. at 31.
102 R.v. National News Co. Ltd. (1953), 106 C.C.C. 26 (Ont. C.A.) (The paperback books
at issue were Erskine Caldwell's Journeyman (Penguin #646, 1947) and Tragic Ground
(Penguin 661, 1948), Mae West's Diamond Lil (Dell #525, 1951), and Tereska Torres'
Women's Barracks (Gold Medal #132, 1950)).
103 R. v. American News Company Limited, [1957] O.R. 145 (C.A.) (The paperback book
at issue was Peter Denzer's Episode (Popular Library #621, 1954)).
104 R. v. Cameron, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 273 (Ont. C.A.), appeal quashed and leave to appeal
dismissed, [ 1967] 2 C.C.C. 195 [Cameron].
'o' Ibid. at 288.
'06 Ibid.
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Laskin J.A., alone in dissent in the Cameron case, was willing to confront the
inadequacies of the public good defence. He pointed out that it would be more
coherent to remove material that serves the public good from our
understanding of obscenity altogether, rather than treating acts that serve the
public good as a defence.' °7 He added that "the anomalous character of the
defence is aggravated by Parliament's failure to provide any definition or any
clue to its meaning".1
0 8
Bora Laskin's observations are equally applicable to the child pornography
offence if Bill C-20 passes in its current form. The vague and undefined
public good defence would carry the entire burden of exonerating any creative
visual or written representations that have as a dominant characteristic the
depiction of child or youth sexuality for a sexual purpose, or any creative
visual representations of children or youth engaging in explicit sexual activity,
or any creative visual representations that depict the sexual organs or anal
region of children or youth for sexual purposes. Clearly, paintings like Eli
Langer's - and a wide range of other harmless forms of artistic expression -
could be vulnerable to destruction in a forfeiture application if Bill C-20
becomes law. Artists would be vulnerable to prosecution for simple
possession if they showed their work to others.'09 In addition, artists and
galleries would be vulnerable to prosecution for putting on public exhibits.
Patrons of art galleries could be prosecuted just for looking if they attended an
exhibit like the Mercer Union show with knowledge of its contents - or if they
did not avert their eyes immediately upon viewing the material. The same
would be true of anyone visiting an artist's studio. It is plain that the insistence
on treating creative expression in the same way as "real" child pornography
may lead to increasingly absurd and disturbing consequences.
iii. Show Me!
My third example of harmless sexual expression potentially caught by
Canada's evolving and expanding child pornography law is the sex education
book Show Me!."0 Originally published in Germany, Show Me! generated
controversy in North America from the outset because it presents information
about child and youth sexuality in a context devoid of shame or
embarrassment. It uses graphic photographs by American photographer Will
'07 Ibid. at 315.
108 Ibid.
109 The exception for private possession of creative expression carved out by the Supreme
Court in Sharpe 2001 (see supra note 8) would then no longer apply, because the exception
applies only to material held exclusively for the creator's use.
110 Will McBride and Helga Fleischhauer-Hardt, Show Me!: A Picture Book of Sex for
Children and Parents (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975).
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McBride to depict subjects such as children's erotic play, teenagers' sexual
exploration, sexual intercourse, pregnancy and childbirth. The text
accompanying the pictures includes children's spontaneous responses to the
vivid imagery in the book. The book concludes with information for parents
about sexuality and sex education written by German psychologist Helga
Fleischhauer-Hardt.
Show Me!'s unorthodox approach to the sexual education of children and
youth is explained in the foreword:
We have made this book for children and parents. In their hands it can be an aid to
sexual enlightenment. But above all we hope it will show parents that natural
sexuality develops only when children are surrounded from birth onwards by a
loving family and environment which does not repress sexuality. We don't believe
a child will have "found the answer" to sex simply by looking at the pictures in
this book. A good understanding requires rather a continuing exchange between
parent and child, a dialogue which helps the child express his questions and
problems concerning sex and resolve them. The photographic part of this book is
meant as a taking-off point for parents. Internal bodily processes such as
conception and pregnancy as well as anatomical facts should be presented to the
child in simple words by the parents themselves. The text at the end of the book
makes suggestions for this purpose. It gives parents basic information on the
development of sexuality and sex education. We are of the opinion that only an
explicit and realistic presentation of sex can spare children fear and guilt feelings
related to sexuality. For this reason we chose photography as a medium. With
much care and under great difficulty we succeeded in photographing the children
in such a way that their natural behavior came through, We thank the children and
their parents for their help in putting together the photographs. The captions to the
pictures are gathered from their spontaneous comments. We hope this book will
serve parents and children as a source of information and guide them toward a
happy sexuality marked by love, tenderness and responsibility."'
When, in the summer of 1975, MacMillan Company sought to import the
book for distribution in Canada, it was banned by Customs. The ban was lifted
after a month and MacMillan commenced distribution, at which point the
company was charged with violating the obscenity provision of the Criminal
Code. After a trial featuring a range of witnesses, including Marshall
McLuhan for the Crown, and Rabbi Gunther Plaut for the defence, the judge
concluded that the book was not obscene. 1 2 Graburn Co. Ct. J. noted that the
book recognizes pre-marital pubertal sexuality "as one of life's realities"." 3
He identified "sexual conduct in the context of love" as the theme of the
... Ibid. at 3-4.
112 R. v. MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd. (1976), 31 C.C.C. (2d) 286 (Ont. Co. Ct. J. Crim.
Ct.) [MacMillan].
... Ibid. at 318.
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book. 114 In concluding that Show Me! did not offend community standards of
tolerance, he recognized a truth that child pornography law seems determined
to suppress: children are sexual beings. In his words,
Sexual education, in the view of the authors and some of the witnesses, should
begin at an early age. Many parents, I am told both by the authors and the
witnesses, are unaware of their own total sexuality and view it with feelings of
guilt and repression. Parents in such a condition cannot be expected to convey to
their children a healthy attitude towards sexual matters. If parents do become
informed and aware of their own sexuality, then they are in a position to deal
positively and healthily with the fact that their children are sexual beings and to
develop their children's sexuality with the help of the book, within the framework
of the family, love, responsibility and morality, according to the witnesses.''
5
Graburn Co. Ct. J. gave careful consideration to the question of whether
the book involved any harm in production, the very issue that later emerged as
the dominant concern of child pornography law. He concluded that the authors
were not "callous to the rights and dignity of the children", noting that there
was no evidence to contradict the authors' claim that the parents of the
children depicted in the book were present and helpful during the
photography. 16 As a result of his thoughtful and comprehensive ruling, Show
Me! circulated freely in Canada in the mid-1970s.
Graburn Co. Ct. J.'s emphasis on educative value and the absence of harm
in production in the Show Me! trial provides a sharp contrast to the assessment
of the book that occurred twenty-five years later in a child pornography
prosecution. In R. v. Nedelec,"7 the accused was charged and convicted of
simple possession of visual images that he had downloaded from the Internet
and collected from magazines and other sources. The police also found the
book Show Me! in the accused's collection of pornographic material. Wedge J.
found that the book, along with much of the other material seized, constituted
child pornography. In doing so, she did not cite the MacMillan ruling, nor did
she contradict Graburn Co. Ct. J.'s conclusion that there was no evidence that
the book involved harm in production. She simply concluded that the photos
violated the definition of child pornography in s. 163.1(1), and briskly
dismissed the argument that any defence could be raised on behalf of Show
Me!:
I conclude that the defence of educational purpose is not available to Mr. Nedelec.
The book "Show Me" is described by its authors as a "picture book of sex for
114 Ibid. at 319.
1 " Ibid. at 321.
116 Ibid. at 314.
... 2001 BCSC 1334 [Nedelecl.
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children and parents" whose objective is "to contribute to the sexual liberation of
children and adolescents". Notwithstanding this characterization of the book by its
authors, I conclude that when viewed objectively the book is thinly disguised child
pornography. It blatantly sexualizes children. It also sends the message young
children are capable of enga ging in sexual activity and that such activity should be
encouraged and promoted."
The shift in tone and perspective from the 1976 ruling in MacMillan to the
2001 ruling in Nedelec provides an illuminating measure of the regressive
impact of child pornography law. The MacMillan ruling emphasizes the
educative value of openly confronting the fact that children and youth have
erotic feelings and sexual curiosity. It also asks whether any children or
youths were harmed in the production of the material. The Nedelec ruling, on
the other hand, asks us to adopt a "pedophilic gaze". The judge assessed Show
Me! solely from the point of view of persons who desire sexual contact with
children. According to this perspective, the potential impact of expressive
material on pedophiles determines what can circulate lawfully for all of
society. The Nedelec ruling supports Amy Adler's observation that "[c]hild
pornography law has changed the way we look at children... The law requires
us to study pictures of children to uncover their potential sexual meanings, and
in doing so, it explicitly exhorts us to take on the perspective of the
pedophile."11
9
The Hicklin test of obscenity was often criticized and ultimately rejected in
part because it let the supposed moral vulnerabilities of youth and the lower
classes determine the scope of freedom of expression for everyone. The
pedophile now substitutes for the child and the morally suspect masses, but
the effect is the same. Our conclusion in either case should also be the same:
moral corruption arguments do not provide sufficiently compelling reasons to
justify the suppression of expressive material by the criminal law.
IV. FROM SEX AND ART TO VIOLENCE AND HATE
In conclusion, let me briefly summarize the argument I have presented. The
incoherence of Canadian child pornography law has its roots in Parliament's
decision to use the criminal law to respond in the same way to three very
different categories of sexual representations. The different kinds of harm
involved in each category call for distinct legal responses.
First, I have suggested that material that involved harm in production
should be the focus of our condemnation. There is no reason to restrict our
condemnation of this sort of material to images that involved the infliction of
harm to children in their production. Nor should we restrict the criminal law's
118 Ibid. at para. 54.
119 Adler, "Perverse Law" supra note 5 at 256.
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response to images recording the commission of sexual acts. Material that
involved serious harms in production should be treated separately by the
criminal law and punished harshly. A case can be made to justify offences of
simple possession and even simply viewing expressive material, so long as the
prohibition is narrowly tailored to capture only material that involved harm in
production.
Second, I have suggested that material that did not involve harm in
production should be the subject of criminal prosecution only if it meets the
definition of hate propaganda set out in the Criminal Code. Again, artistic
merit should be no defence. It should not be an offence to simply possess or
simply access this material, since our concern is with the public dissemination
of the most vitriolic forms of hate speech.
Finally, I have argued that expressive material that did not involve harm in
its production, and that falls short of hate propaganda, should be no concern of
the criminal law. Moral corruption arguments do not provide a compelling
basis for the imposition of criminal sanctions on the creation, dissemination
and use of expressive material. To justify criminal prohibitions, we need a
reason other than our dislike of the ideas expressed. The notion that exposure
to fictional or imaginary representations of criminal acts causes criminal
behaviour is a persistent one. The social science evidence, however, does not
support the "causal hypothesis" in relation to this type of material. We ought
not to rely on it as the basis for criminal prohibitions. If we can succeed in
leaving the moral corruption paradigm behind, sexuality and art would no
longer be the central concepts in the debate. Perhaps we would then be less
distracted from the urgent need to focus on eradicating the conditions that
produce violence and hate. Those conditions include, but are by no means
limited to, the prevalence of hate propaganda and of expressive material that
involved violence in its production.
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